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Abstract—Large-scale bandwidth-based distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks can quickly knock out
substantial parts of a network before reactive defenses
can respond. Even trafﬁc ﬂows that are not under direct
attack can suffer signiﬁcant collateral damage if these
ﬂows pass through links that are common to attack
routes. Given the existence today of large botnets with
more than a hundred thousand bots, the potential for
a large-scale coordinated attack exists, especially given
the prevalence of high-speed Internet access. This paper
presents a Proactive Surge Protection (PSP) mechanism
that aims to provide a broad ﬁrst line of defense against
DDoS attacks. The approach aims to minimize collateral
damage by providing bandwidth isolation between trafﬁc
ﬂows. This isolation is achieved through a combination
of trafﬁc measurements, bandwidth allocation of network
resources, metering and tagging of packets at the network
perimeter, and preferential dropping of packets inside
the network. The proposed solution is readily deployable
using existing router mechanisms and does not rely on
any unauthenticated packet header information. Thus
the approach is resilient to evading attack schemes that
launch many seemingly legitimate TCP connections with
spoofed IP addresses and port numbers. Finally, our
extensive evaluation results across two large commercial
backbone networks, using both distributed and targeted
attack scenarios, show that up to 95.5% of the network
could suffer collateral damage without protection, but
our solution was able to signiﬁcantly reduce the amount
of collateral damage by up to 97.58% in terms of the
number of packets dropped and 90.36% in terms of the
number of ﬂows with packet loss. Furthermore, we show
that PSP can maintain low packet loss rates even when
the intensity of attacks is increased signiﬁcantly.
I. INTRODUCTION
A coordinated attack can potentially disable a network
by ﬂooding it with trafﬁc. Such attacks are also known
as bandwidth-based distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks and are the focus of our work. Depending on
the operator, the provider network may be a small-to-
medium regional network or a large core network. For
small-to-medium size regional networks, this type of
bandwidth-based attacks has certainly disrupted service
in the past. For core networks with huge capacities, one
might argue that such an attack risk is remote. However,
as reported in the media [6], large botnets already exist
in the Internet today. These large botnets combined with
the prevalence of high speed Internet access can quite
easily give attackers multiple tens of Gb/s of attack
capacity. Moreover, core networks are oversubscribed.
For example, in the Abilene network [1], some of the
core routers have an incoming capacity of larger than
30 Gb/s from the access networks, but only 20 Gb/s
of outgoing capacity to the core. Although commercial
ISPs do not publish their oversubscription levels, they
are generally substantially higher than the ones found
in the Abilene network due to commercial pressures of
maximizing return on investments.
Considering these insights, one might wonder why
we have not seen multiple successful bandwidth-based
attacks to large core networks in the past. The answer
to this question is difﬁcult to assess. Partially, attacks
might not be occurring because the organizations which
control the botnets are interested in making money by
distributing SPAM, committing click frauds, or extorting
money from mid-sized websites. Therefore, they would
have no commercial interest in disrupting the Internet as
a whole. Another reason might be that network operators
are closely monitoring their trafﬁc and actively trying
to intervene. Nonetheless, recent history has shown that
if such an attack possibility exists, it will eventually
be exploited. For example, SYN ﬂooding attacks were
described in [3] years before such attacks were used to
disrupt servers in the Internet.
To defend against large bandwidth-based DDoS at-
tacks, a number of defense mechanisms currently exist,
but many are reactive in nature (i.e., they can only
respond after an attack has been identiﬁed in an effort
to limit the damage). However, the onset of large-
scale bandwidth-based attacks can occur almost instan-
taneously, causing potentially a huge surge in trafﬁc that
can effectively knock out substantial parts of a network
before reactive defense mechanisms have a chance to
respond. To provide a broad ﬁrst line of defense against
DDoS attacks when they happen, we propose a new
protection mechanism called Proactive Surge Protection
(PSP). In particular, under a ﬂooding attack, trafﬁc
loads along attack routes will exceed link capacities,
causing packets to be dropped indiscriminately. Without
proactive protection, even for trafﬁc ﬂows that are not
under direct attack, substantial packet loss will occur if
these ﬂows pass through links that are common to attack
routes, resulting in signiﬁcant collateral damage. The
PSP solution is based on providing bandwidth isolationbetween trafﬁc ﬂows so that the collateral damage to
trafﬁc ﬂows not under direct attack is substantially
reduced.
This bandwidth isolation is achieved through a com-
bination of trafﬁc data collection, bandwidth allocation
of network capacity based on trafﬁc measurements, me-
tering and tagging of packets at the network perimeter
into two differentiated priority classes based on capacity
allocation, and preferential dropping of packets in the
network when link capacities are exceeded. It is im-
portant to note that PSP has no impact on the regular
operation of the network if no link is overloaded. It
therefore introduces no penalty in the common case.
In addition, PSP is deployable using existing router
mechanisms that are already available in modern routers,
which makes our approach scalable, feasible, and cost
effective. Further, PSP is resilient to IP spooﬁng as well
as changes in the underlying trafﬁc characteristics such
as the number of TCP connections. This is due to the
fact that we focus on protecting trafﬁc between different
ingress-egress interface pairs in a provider network and
both the ingress and egress interface of an IP datagram
can be directly determined by the network operator.
Therefore, the network operator does not have to rely
on unauthenticated information such as a source or
destination IP address to tag a packet.
The work presented in this paper substantially extends
a preliminary version of our work that was initially
presented at a workshop [10]. In particular, we propose
a new bandwidth allocation algorithm called CDF-PSP
that takes into consideration the trafﬁc variability ob-
served in historical trafﬁc measurements. CDF-PSP aims
to maximize in a max-min fair manner the acceptance
probability (or equivalently the min-max minimization
of the drop probability) of packets by using the cu-
mulative distribution function over historical data sets
as the objective function. By taking into consideration
the trafﬁc variability, we show that the effectiveness of
our protection mechanism can be signiﬁcantly improved.
In addition, we have also substantially extended our
preliminary work with much more extensive in-depth
evaluation of our proposed PSP mechanism using de-
tailed trace-driven simulations.
To test the robustness of our proposed approach,
we evaluated the PSP mechanism using both highly
distributed attack scenarios involving a high percentage
of ingress and egress routers, as well as targeted attack
scenarios in which the attacks are concentrated to a small
number of egress destinations. Our extensive evaluations
across two large commercial backbone networks show
that up to 95.5% of the network could suffer collateral
damage without protection, and our solution was able to
signiﬁcantly reduce the amount of collateral damage by
up to 97.58% in terms of the number of packets dropped
and up to 90.36% in terms of the number of ﬂows with
packet loss.
In comparison to our preliminary work, the perfor-
mance of our new algorithm was able to achieve a
relative reduction of up to 53.09% in terms of the
number of packets dropped and up to 59.30% in terms
of the number of ﬂows with packet loss. In addition, we
show that PSP can maintain low packet loss rates even
when the intensity of attacks is increased signiﬁcantly.
Beyond evaluating extensively the impact of our protec-
tion scheme on packet drops, we also present detailed
analysis on the impact of our scheme at the level of ﬂow
aggregates between individual ingress-egress interface
pairs in the network.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II outlines related work. Section III presents a high-
level overview of our proposedPSP approach.Section IV
describes in greater details the central component of our
proposed architecture that deals with bandwidth alloca-
tion policies. Section V describes our experimental setup,
and Section VI presents extensive evaluation of our
proposed solutions across two large backbone networks.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
DDoS protection has received considerable attention
in the literature. The oldest approach, still heavily in
use today, is typically based on coarse-grain trafﬁc
anomalies detection [20], [2]. Traceback techniques [32],
[27], [28] are then used to identify the true attack
source, which could be disguised by IP spooﬁng. Af-
ter detecting the true source of the DDoS trafﬁc the
network operator can block the DDoS trafﬁc on its
ingress interfaces by conﬁguring access control lists or
by using DDoS scrubbing devices such as [4]. Although
these approaches are practical, they do not allow for an
instantaneous protection of the network. As implemented
today, theses approaches require multiple minutes to
detect and mitigate DDoS attacks, which does not match
the time sensitivity of today’s applications. Similarly,
network management mechanisms that generally aim to
ﬁnd alternate routes around congested links also do not
operate on a time scale that matches the time sensitivity
of today’s applications.
More recently, the research community has focused
on enhancing the current Internet protocol and routing
implementations. For example, multiple proposals have
suggested to limit the best effort connectivity of the net-
work using techniques such as capabilities models [24],
[33], proof-of-work schemes [18], ﬁltering schemes [19]
or default-off communication models [7]. The main
focus of these papers is the protection of customers
connecting to the core network rather than protecting
the core itself, which is the focus of our work. Toillustrate the difference, consider a scenario in which
an attacker controls a large number of zombies. These
zombies could communicate with each other, granting
each other capabilities or similar rights to communicate.
If planned properly, this trafﬁc is still sufﬁcient to attack
a core network. The root of the problem is that the core
cannot trust either the sender or the receiver of the trafﬁc
to protect itself.
Several proactive solutions have been proposed. One
solution was presented in [30]. Similar to the proposals
limiting connectivity cited above, it focuses on protecting
individual customers. This leads again to a trust issue in
that a service provider should not trust its customers for
protection. Furthermore, their solution relies heavily on
the operator and customers knowing a priori who are
the good and bad network entities, and their solution
has a scalability issue in that it is not scalable to
maintain detailed per-customer state for all customers
within the network. Router-based defense mechanisms
have also been proposed as a way to mitigate bandwidth-
based attacks. They generally operate either on trafﬁc
aggregates [16] or on individual ﬂows [21]. However,
as shown in [31], these router-based mechanisms can be
defeated in several ways. Moreover, deploying router-
based defense mechanisms like pushback at every router
can be challenging.
Our work builds on the existing body of literature on
max-min fair resource allocation [8], [29], [15], [9], [25],
[26], [23] to the problem of proactive DDoS defense.
However, our work here is different in that we use
max-min fair allocation for the purpose of differential
tagging of packets with the objective of minimizing
collateral damage when a DDoS attack occurs. Our
work here is also different than the server-centric DDoS
defense mechanism proposed in [34], which is aimed
at protecting end-hosts rather than the network. In their
solution, a server explicitly negotiates with selected
upstream routers to throttle trafﬁc destined to it. Max-
min fairness is applied to set the throttling rates of these
selected upstream routers. Like [30] discussed above,
their solution also has a scalability issue in that the
selected upstream routers must maintain per-customer
state for the requested rate limits.
Finally, our work also builds on existing preferential
dropping mechanisms that have been developed for
providing Quality-of-Service (QoS) [11], [12]. However,
for providing QoS, the service-level-agreements that
dictate the bandwidth allocation are assumed to be either
speciﬁed by customers or decided by the operator for the
purpose of trafﬁc engineering. There is also a body of
work on measurement-based admission control for deter-
mining whether or not to admit new trafﬁc into the net-
work, e.g. [14], [17]. With both service-level-agreement-
based and admission-control-based bandwidth reserva-
tion schemes, rate limits are enforced. Our work here
is different in that we use preferential dropping for a
different purpose to provide bandwidth isolation between
trafﬁc ﬂows to minimize the damage that attack trafﬁc
can cause to regular trafﬁc. Our solution is based on
a combination of trafﬁc measurements, fair bandwidth
allocation, soft admission control at the network perime-
ter, and lazy dropping of trafﬁc inside the network only
when needed. As the mechanisms of differential tagging
and preferential droppingare already available in modern
routers, our solution is readily deployable.
III. PROACTIVE SURGE PROTECTION
In this section, we present a high-level architectural
overview of a DDoS defense solution called Proactive
Surge Protection (PSP). To illustrate the basic concept,
we will depict an example scenario for the Abilene
network. That network consists of 11 core routers that
are interconnected by OC192 (10 Gb/s) links. For the
purpose of depiction, we will zoom in on a portion of
the Abilene network, as shown in Figure 1(a). Consider
a simple illustrative situation in which there is a sud-
den bandwidth-based attack along the origin-destination
(OD) pair Chicago/NY, where an OD pair is deﬁned to
be the corresponding pair of ingress and egress nodes.
Suppose that the magnitude of the attack trafﬁc is 10
Gb/s. This attack trafﬁc, when combined with the regular
trafﬁc for the OD pairs Sunnyvale/NY and Denver/NY
(3 + 3 + 10 = 16 Gb/s), will signiﬁcantly oversubscribe
the 10 Gb/s Chicago/NY link, resulting in a high per-
centage of indiscriminate packet drops. Although the
OD pairs Sunnyvale/NY and Denver/NY are not under
direct attack, these ﬂows will also suffer substantial
packet loss on links which they share with the attack
OD pair, resulting in signiﬁcant collateral damage. The
ﬂows between Sunnyvale/NY and Denver/NY are said
to be caught in the crossﬁre of the Chicago/NY attack.
A. PSP Approach
The PSP approach is based on providing bandwidth
isolation between different trafﬁc ﬂows so that the
amount of collateral damage sustained along crossﬁre
trafﬁc ﬂows is minimized. This bandwidth isolation is
achieved by using a form of soft admission control
at the perimeter of a provider network. In particular,
to avoid saturation of network links, we impose rate
limits on the amount of trafﬁc that gets injected into
the network for each OD pair. However, rather than
imposing a hard rate limit, where packets are blocked
from entering the network, we classify packets into two
priority classes, high and low. Metering is performed
at the perimeter of the network, and packets are tagged
high if the arrival rate is below a certain threshold. But
when a certain threshold is exceeded, packets will getSunnyvale/NY:
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tagged as low priority. Then, when a network link gets
saturated, e.g. when an attack occurs, packets tagged
with a low priority will be dropped preferentially. This
ensures that our solution does not drop trafﬁc unless a
network link capacity has indeed been exceeded. Under
normal network conditions, in the absence of sustained
congestion, packets will get forwarded in the same
manner as without our solution.
Consider again the above example, now depicted
in Figure 1(b). Suppose we set the high priority rate
limit for the OD pairs Sunnyvale/NY, Denver/NY, and
Chicago/NY to 3.5 Gb/s, 3.5 Gb/s, and 3 Gb/s, respec-
tively. This will ensure that the total trafﬁc admitted
as high priority on the Chicago/NY link is limited to
10 Gb/s. Operators can also set maximum rate limits
to some factor below the link capacity to provide the
desired headroom (e.g. set the target link load to be
90%). If the limit set for a particular OD pair is above
the actual amount of trafﬁc along that ﬂow, then all
packets for that ﬂow will get tagged as high priority.
Consider the OD pair Chicago/NY. Suppose the actual
trafﬁc under an attack is 10 Gb/s, which is above the 3
Gb/s limit. Then, only 3 Gb/s of trafﬁc will get tagged
as high priority, and 7 Gb/s will get tagged as low
priority. Since the total demand on the Chicago link
exceeds the 10 Gb/s link capacity, considerable packets
would get dropped. However, the packets drop will come
from the OD pair Chicago/NY since all packets from
Sunnyvale/NY and Denver/NY would have been tagged
as high priority. Therefore, the packets for the OD pairs
Sunnyvale/NY and Denver/NY would be shielded from
collateral damage.
Although our simple illustrative example shown in
Figure 1 only involved one attack ﬂow from one ingress
point, the attack trafﬁc in general can be highly dis-
tributed. As we shall see in Section VI, the proposed
PSP method is also quite effective in such distributed
attack scenarios.
B. PSP Architecture
Our proposed PSP architecture is depicted in Figure 2.
The architecture is divided into a policy plane and an
enforcement plane. The trafﬁc data collection and band-
width allocation components are on the policy plane, and
the differential tagging and preferential drop components
are on the enforcement plane.
Trafﬁc Data Collector: The role of the trafﬁc data
collection component is to collect and summarize his-
torical trafﬁc measurements. For example, the widely
deployed Cisco sampled NetFlow mechanism can be
used in conjunction with measurement methodologies
such that those outlined in [13] to collect and derive
trafﬁc matrices for different times throughout a day, a
week, a month, etc, between different origin-destination
(OD) pairs of ingress-egress nodes. The infrastructure for
this trafﬁc data collection already exists in most service
provider networks. The derived trafﬁc matrices are used
to estimate the range of expected trafﬁc demands for
different time periods.
Bandwidth Allocator: Given the historical trafﬁc data
collected, the role of the bandwidth allocator is to deter-
mine the rate limits at different time periods. For each
time period t, the bandwidth allocator will determine a
bandwidth allocation matrix, B(t)=[bs,d(t)] , where
bs,d(t) is the rate limit for the corresponding OD pair
with ingress node s and egress node d for a particular
time of day t. For example, a different bandwidth allo-
cation matrix B(t) may be computed for each hour in a
day using the historical trafﬁc data collected for same
hour of the day. Under normal operating conditions,
network links are typically underutilized. Therefore, traf-
ﬁc demands from historical measurements will reﬂect
this underutilization. Since there is likely to be room
for admitting more trafﬁc into the high priority class
than observed in the historical measurements, we can
fully allocate in some fair manner the available network
resources to high priority trafﬁc. By fully allocating
the available network resources beyond the previouslyobserved trafﬁc, we can provide headroom to account
for estimation inaccuracies and trafﬁc burstiness. The
bandwidth allocation matrices can be computed ofﬂine,
and operators can remotely conﬁgure routers at the
network perimeter with these matrices using existing
router conﬁguration mechanisms.
Differentiated Tagging: Given the rate limits deter-
mined by the bandwidth allocator, the role of the differ-
ential tagging component is to perform the metering and
tagging of packets in accordance to the determined rate
limits. This component is implemented at the perimeter
of the network. In particular, packets arriving at ingress
node s and destined to egress node d are tagged as high
priority if their metered rates are below the threshold
given by bs,d(t), using the bandwidth allocation matrix
B(t) for the corresponding time of day. Otherwise, they
are tagged as low priority. These trafﬁc management
mechanisms for metering and tagging are commonly
available in modern routers at linespeeds.
Preferential Drops: With packets tagged at the perime-
ter, low priority packets can be dropped preferentially
over high priority packets at a network router whenever
a sustained congestion occurs. Again, this preferential
dropping mechanism [11] is commonly available in
modern routers at linespeeds. By using preferential drop
at interior routers rather than simply blocking packets at
the perimeter when a rate limit has been reached, our
solution ensures that no packet gets dropped unless a
network link capacity has indeed been exceeded. Under
normal network conditions, in the absence of sustained
congestion, packets will get forwarded in the same
manner as without our surge protection scheme.
IV. BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION POLICIES
Intuitively, PSP works by fully allocating the available
network resources into the high priority class in some
fair manner so that the high priority class rate limits
for the different OD pairs are at least as high as the
expected normal trafﬁc. This way, should a DDoS attack
occur that would saturate links along the attack route,
normal trafﬁc corresponding to crossﬁre OD pairs would
be isolated from the attack trafﬁc, thus minimizing
collateral damage. In particular, packets for a particular
crossﬁre OD pair would only be dropped at a congested
network link if the actual normal trafﬁc for that ﬂow
is above the bandwidth allocation threshold given to
it. Therefore, bandwidth allocation plays a central role
in affecting the drop probability of normal crossﬁre
trafﬁc during an attack. As such, the goal of bandwidth
allocation is to allocate the available network resources
with the objective of minimizing the drop probabilities
for all OD pairs in some fair manner.
A. Formulation
To achieve the objectives of minimizing drop probabil-
ity and ensuring fair allocation of network resources, we
formulate the bandwidth allocation problem as a utility
max-min fair allocation problem [8], [9], [26], [23]. The
utility max-min fair allocation problem can be stated as
follows. Let   x =( x1,x 2,...,x N) be the allocation to
N ﬂows, and let (β1(x1),β 2(x2),...,β N(xN)) be N
utility functions, with each βi(xi) corresponding to the
utility function for ﬂow i. An allocation   x is said to
be utility max-min fair if and only if increasing one
component xi must be at the expense of decreasing some
other component xj such that βj(xj) ≤ βi(xi).
Conventionally, the literature on max-min
fair allocation uses the vector notation   x(t)=
(x1(t),x 2(t),...,x N(t)) to represent the allocation
for some time period t. The correspondence to our
bandwidth allocation matrix B(t)=[bs,d(t)]is
straightforward: bsi,di(t)=xi(t) is the bandwidth
allocation at time t for ﬂow i, with the corresponding
OD pair of ingress and egress nodes (si,d i). Unless
otherwise clariﬁed, we will use the conventional vector
notation   x(t)=( x1(t),x 2(t),...,x N(t)) and our
bandwidth allocation matrix notation interchangeably.
The utility max-min fair allocation problem has been
well-studied, and as shown in [9], [26], the problem
can be solved by means of a “water-ﬁlling” algorithm.
We brieﬂy outline here how the algorithm works. The
basic idea is to iteratively calculate the utility max-
min fair share for each ﬂow in the network. Initially,
all ﬂows are allocated rate xi =0and are considered
free, meaning that its rate can be further increased.
At each iteration, the water-ﬁlling algorithm aims to
ﬁnd largest increase in bandwidth allocation to free
ﬂows that will result in the maximum common utility
with the available link capacities. The provided utility
functions, (β1(x1),β 2(x2),...,β N(xN)), are used to
determine this maximum common utility. When a link is
saturated, it is removed from further consideration, and
the corresponding ﬂows that cross these saturated links
are ﬁxed from further increase in bandwidth allocation.
The algorithm convergesafter at most L iterations, where
L is the number of links in the network, since at least
one new link becomes saturated in each iteration. The
reader is referred to [9], [26] for detailed discussions.
In the context of PSP, the utility max-min fair algo-
rithm is used to implement different bandwidth alloca-
tion policies. In particular, we describe in this section
two bandwidth allocation policies, one called Mean-
PSP, and the other called CDF-PSP. Both are based
on trafﬁc data collected from historical trafﬁc mea-
surements. The ﬁrst policy, Mean-PSP, simply uses the
average historical trafﬁc demands observed as weights in
the corresponding utility functions. Mean-PSP is basedTABLE I
TRAFFIC DEMANDS AND THE CORRESPONDINGBANDWIDTH
ALLOCATIONS FOR MEAN-PSP AND CDF-PSP.
Flows Historical trafﬁc measurements BW allocation
Measured demands Mean Mean-PSP CDF-PSP
(sorted) 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
(A,D) 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
(B,D) 1 1 1 3 4 2 2 2 3 3
(C,D) 4 5 5 5 11 6 6 6 5 5
(A,C) 4 5 5 5 11 6 6 8 5 8
(B,C) 5 5 6 6 8 6 6 8 6 7
on the simple intuition that ﬂows with higher average
trafﬁc demands should receive proportionally higher
bandwidth allocation. This policy was ﬁrst presented in
our preliminary work [10]. However, this policy does
not directly consider the trafﬁc variance observed in the
trafﬁc measurements.
To directly account for trafﬁc variance, we propose a
second policy, CDF-PSP, that explicitly aims to minimize
drop probabilities by using the Cumulative Distribu-
tion Functions (CDFs) [8] derived from the empirical
distribution of trafﬁc demands observed in the trafﬁc
measurements. These CDFs can be used to capture the
probability that the actual trafﬁc will not exceed a par-
ticular bandwidth allocation. When these CDFs are used
as utility functions, maximizing the utility corresponds
directly to the minimization of drop probabilities. Each
of these two policies is further illustrated next.
B. Mean-PSP: Mean-based Max-min Fairness
Our ﬁrst allocation policy, Mean-PSP, simply uses the
mean trafﬁc demand as the utility function. In particular,
the utility function for ﬂow i is a simple linear function
βi(x)= x
µi, where μi is the mean trafﬁc demand of ﬂow
i, which simpliﬁes to an easier weighted max-min fair
allocation problem.
To illustrate how Mean-PSP works, consider the small
example shown in Figure 3. It depicts a simple network
topology with 4 nodes that are interconnected by 10 Gb/s
links. Consider the corresponding trafﬁc measurements
shown in Table I. For simplicity of illustration, each ﬂow
is described by just 5 data points, and the corresponding
mean trafﬁc demands are also indicated in Table I.
Consider the ﬁrst iteration of the Mean-PSP water-ﬁlling
procedure shown in Figure 4(a). The maximum common
utility that can be achieved by all free ﬂows is β(x)=1 ,
which corresponds to allocating 2 Gb/s each to the
OD pairs (A,D) and (B,D) and 6 Gb/s each to the
OD pairs (C,D), (A,C), and (B,C). For example,
βA,D(x)=x
µ =1corresponds to allocating x =2Gb/s
since μ for (A,D) is 2. Since all three ﬂows, (A,D),
(B,D), and (C,D), share a common link CD, the sum
of their ﬁrst iteration allocation, 2 + 2 +6=1 0Gb/s,
would already saturate link CD. This saturated link is
removed from consideration in subsequent iterations, and
the ﬂows (A,D), (B,D), and (C,D) are ﬁxed at the
allocation of 2 Gb/s, 2 Gb/s, and 6 Gb/s, respectively.
On the other hand, link AC is only shared by ﬂows
(A,C) and (A,D), which has an aggregate allocation
o f2+6=8Gb/s on link AC after the ﬁrst iteration.
This leaves 10 − 8 = 2 Gb/s of residual capacity for
the next iteration. Similarly, link BC is only shared by
ﬂows (B,C) and (B,D), which also has an aggregate
allocation of 2 + 6 = 8 Gb/s on link BC after the ﬁrst
iteration, with 2 Gb/s of residual capacity. After the ﬁrst
iteration, ﬂows (A,C) and (B,C) remain free.
In the second iteration, as in shown Figure 4(b), the
maximum common utility is achieved by allocating the
remaining 2 Gb/s on link AC to ﬂow (A,C) and the
remaining 2 Gb/s on link BC to ﬂow (B,C), resulting
in each ﬂow having 8 Gb/s allocated to it in total. The
ﬁnal Mean-PSP bandwidth allocation is shown in Table I.
C. CDF-PSP: CDF-based Max-min Fairness
Our second allocation policy, CDF-PSP, aims to ex-
plicitly capture the trafﬁc variance observed in historical
trafﬁc measurements by using a Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) model as the utility function. In partic-
ular, the use of CDFs [8] captures the acceptance prob-
ability of a particular bandwidth allocation as follows.
Let Xi(t) be a random variable that represents the actual
normal trafﬁc for ﬂow i at time t, and let xi(t) be the
bandwidth allocation. Then the CDF of Xi(t) is denoted
as
Pr[Xi(t) ≤ xi(t)] = Φi,t(xi(t)),
and the drop probability is simply the complementary
function
Pr[Xi(t) >x i(t)] = 1 − Φi,t(xi(t)).
Therefore, when CDFs are used to maximize the accep-
tance probabilities for all ﬂows in a max-min fair man-
ner, it is equivalent to minimizing the drop probabilities
for all ﬂows in a min-max fair manner.
In general, the expected trafﬁc can be modeled using
different probability density functions with the corre-
sponding CDFs. One probability density function is to
use the empirical distribution that directly corresponds
to the historical trafﬁc measurements taken. In particu-
lar, let (ri,1(t),r i,2(t),...,r i,M(t)) be M measurements
taken for ﬂow i at a particular time of day t over some
historical data set. Then the empirical CDF is simply
deﬁned as
Φi,t(xi(t)) =
# measurements ≤ xi(t)
M
=
1
M
=
M 
k=1
I(ri,k(t) ≤ xi(t)),A
C
B
D
10Gb/s
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Fig. 3. Network.
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Fig. 6. Empirical CDFs for ﬂows (A, D), (B, D), (C, D), (A, C), (B, C).
where I(ri,k(t) ≤ xi(t)) is the indicator that the mea-
surement ri,k(t) is less than or equal to xi(t). For the
example shown in Table I, the corresponding empirical
CDFs are shown in Figure 6. For example in Figure 6(a)
for OD pair (A,D), a bandwidth allocation of 2 Gb/s
would correspond to an acceptance probability of 80%
(with the corresponding drop probability of 20%).
To illustrate how CDF-PSP works, consider again the
example shown in Figure 3 and Table I. Consider the ﬁrst
iteration of the CDF-PSP water-ﬁlling procedure shown
in Figure 5(a). To simplify notation, we will simply use
for example βA,D(x)=Φ A,D(x) to indicate the utility
function for ﬂow (A,D) for some time period t, and we
will use analogous notations for the other ﬂows.
In the ﬁrst iteration, the maximum common utility
that can be achieved by all free ﬂows is an acceptance
probability of β(x)=80%, which corresponds to
allocating 2 Gb/s to (A,D), 3 Gb/s to (B,D), 5 Gb/s
each to (C,D) and (A,C), and 6 Gb/s to (B,C). This
ﬁrst iteration allocation is shown in bold black lines in
Figure 6. With this allocation in the ﬁrst iteration, link
CD is again saturated since the sum of the ﬁrst iteration
allocation to ﬂows (A,D), (B,D), and (C,D) is 2 +
3+5=1 0Gb/s, which would already reach the link
capacity of CD. Therefore, the saturated link CD is
removed from consideration in subsequent iterations, and
the ﬂows (A,D), (B,D), and (C,D) are ﬁxed at the
allocation of 2 Gb/s, 3 Gb/s, and 5 Gb/s, respectively.
For link AC, which is shared by ﬂows (A,C) and
(A,D), the ﬁrst iteration allocation is 2 + 5 = 7 Gb/s,
leaving 10−7 = 3 Gb/s of residual capacity. Similarly, for
link BC, which is shared by ﬂows (B,C) and (B,D),
the ﬁrst iteration allocation is 3 + 6 = 9 Gb/s, leaving
10 − 9 = 1 Gb/s of residual capacity.
In the second iteration, as in shown Figure 5(b),
the maximum common utility 90% is achieved for the
remaining free ﬂows (A,C) and (B,C) by allocating
the remaining 3 Gb/s on link AC to ﬂow (A,C) and the
remaining 1 Gb/s on link BC to ﬂow (B,C), resulting in
a total of 8 Gb/s allocated to (A,C) and 7 Gb/s allocated
to (B,C). This second iteration allocation is shown in
dotted lines in Figure 6. The ﬁnal CDF-PSP bandwidth
allocation is shown in Table I.
Comparing the results for CDF-PSP and Mean-PSP
shown in Figure 6 and Table I, we see that CDF-PSP was
able to achieve a higher worst-case acceptance probabil-
ity for all ﬂows than Mean-PSP. In particular, the CDF-
PSP results shown in Figure 6 and Table I show that
CDF-PSP was able to achieve a minimum acceptance
probability of 80% for all ﬂows whereas Mean-PSP
was only able to achieve a lower worst-case acceptance
probability of 70%. For example, for ﬂow (B,D), the
bandwidth allocation of 3 Gb/s determined by CDF-
PSP corresponds to an 80% acceptance rate whereas
the 2 Gb/s determined by Mean-PSP only corresponds
to a 70% acceptance rate. The better worst-case result
is because CDF-PSP speciﬁcally targets the max-min
optimization of the acceptance probability by using the
cumulative distribution function as the objective.V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We employed ns-2 based simulations to evaluate our
PSP methods on two large real networks.
US: This is the backbone of a large service provider in
the US, and consists of around 700 routers and thousands
of links ranging from T1 to OC768 speeds.
EU: This is the backbone of a large service provider
in Europe. It has a similar network structure as the US
backbone, but it is larger with about 150 more routers
and 500 more links.
While the results for the individual networks cannot be
directly compared to each other because of differences
in their network characteristics and trafﬁc behavior,
multiple network environments allow us to explore and
understand the performance of our PSP methods for a
range of diverse scenarios.
A. Normal Trafﬁc Demand
For each network, using the methods outlined in [13],
we build ingress router to egress router trafﬁc ma-
trices from several weeks worth of sampled Net-
ﬂow data that record the trafﬁc for that network :
US (07/01/07−09/03/07) and EU (11/18/06−12/18/06
& 07/01/07−09/03/07). Speciﬁcally, the Netﬂow data
contains sampled Netﬂow records covering the entire
network. The sampling is performed on the routers with
1:500 packet sampling rate. The volume of sampled
records are then subsequently reduced using a smart
sampling technique [22]. The total size of smart sampled
data records was 3,600 GB and 1,500 GB for US and
EU, respectively. Finally, we annotate each record with
its customer egress interface (if it was not collected on
the egress router) based on route information.
For each time interval τ, the corresponding OD ﬂows
are represented by a N × N trafﬁc matrix where N is
the number of access routers providing ingress or egress
to the backbone, and each entry contains the average
demand between the corresponding routers within that
interval. The above trafﬁc data are used both for creating
the normal trafﬁc demand for the simulator as well as
for computing the corresponding bandwidth allocation
matrices for the candidate PSP techniques. One desirable
characteristic from a network management, operations
and system overhead perspective is to avoid too many
unnecessary ﬁne time scale changes. Therefore, one goal
of our study was to evaluate the effectiveness of using
a single representative bandwidth allocation matrix for
an extended period of time. An implicit hypothesis is
that the bandwidth allocation matrix does not need to
be computed and updated on a ﬁne timescale. To this
end, in the simulations, we use a ﬁner timescale trafﬁc
matrix with τ =1 min for determining the normal
trafﬁc demand, and a coarser timescale 1 hour interval
for computing the bandwidth allocation matrix from
historical data sets.
B. DDoS Attack Trafﬁc
To test the robustness of our PSP approach, we used
two different types of attack scenarios for evaluation –
a distributed attack scenario for the US backbone and
a targeted attack scenario for the EU backbone. As we
shall see in Section VI, PSP is very effective in both
types of attacks. In particular, we used the following
attack data.
US DDoS: For the US backbone, the attack matrix that
we used for evaluation is based on large DDoS alarms
that were actually generated by a commercial DDoS de-
tection system deployed at key locations in the network.
In particular, among the actual large DDoS alarms there
were generated during the period of 6/1/05 to 7/1/06,
we selected the largest one involving the most number
of attack ﬂows as the attack matrix. This was a highly
distributed attack involving 40% (nearly half) of the
ingress routers as attack sources and 25% of the egress
routers as attack destinations. The number of attack ﬂows
observed at a single ingress router were up to 150 ﬂows,
with an average of about 24 attack ﬂows sourced at each
ingress router. The attacks were distributed over a large
number of egress routers. Although the actual attacks
were large enough to trigger the DDoS alarms, they did
not actually cause overloading on any backbone link.
Therefore, we scaled up each attack ﬂow to an average
of 1% of the ingress router link access capacity. Since
there were many ﬂows, this was already sufﬁcient to
cause overloading on the network.
EU DDoS: For the Europe backbone, we had no com-
mercial DDoS detection logs available. Therefore, we
created our own synthetic DDoS attack data. To eval-
uate PSP under different attack scenarios, we created
a targeted attack scenario in which all attack ﬂows
are targeted to only a small number of egress routers.
In particular, to mimic the US DDoS attack data, we
randomly selected 40% of ingress routers to be attack
sources. However, to create a targeted attack scenario,
we purposely selected at random only 2% of the egress
routers as attack destinations. With only 2% of the egress
routers involved as attack destinations, we concentrated
the attacks from each ingress router to just 1-3 destina-
tions with demand set at 10% of the ingress router link
access capacity.
C. ns-2 Simulation Details
Our experiments are implemented using ns-2 simula-
tions. This involved implementing the 2-class bandwidth
allocation, and simulating both the normal and DDoS
trafﬁc ﬂows.Bandwidth Allocation and Enforcement: The metering
and class differentiation of packets are implemented
at the perimeter of each network using the differen-
tiated service module in ns-2, which allows users to
set rate limits for each individual OD pair. Our simu-
lation updates the rate limits hourly by pre-computing
the bandwidth allocation matrix based on the histori-
cal trafﬁc matrices that were collected several weeks
prior to the attack date: US (07/01/07−09/02/07) and
EU (11/18/06−12/17/06 & 07/01/07−09/02/07).
The differentiated service module marks incoming
packets into different priorities based on the conﬁgured
rate limits set by our bandwidth allocation matrix and
the estimated incoming trafﬁc rate of the OD pair.
Speciﬁcally, we implemented differentiated service using
TSW2CM (Time Sliding Window with 2 Color Mark-
ing), an ns-2 provided policer. As its name implies, the
TSW2CM policer uses a sliding time window to estimate
the trafﬁc rate.
If the estimated trafﬁc exceeds the given threshold,
the incoming packet is marked into the low priority
class; otherwise, it is marked into the high priority class.
We then use existing preferential dropping mechanisms
to ensure that lower priority packets are preferentially
dropped over higher priority packets when memory
buffers get full. In particular, WRED/RIO1 is one such
preferential dropping mechanism that is widely deployed
in existing commercial routers [11], [5]. We used this
WRED/RIO mechanism in our ns-2 simulations.
Trafﬁc Simulation: For simulation data (testing phase),
we purposely used a different data set than the trafﬁc
matrices used for bandwidth allocation (learning phase).
In particular, for each network, we selected a week-day
outside of the days used for bandwidth allocation, and
we considered 48 1-minute time intervals (one every 30-
minutes) across the entire 24 hours of this selected day.
The exact date that we selected to simulate normal trafﬁc
is 09/03/07 for both the US and EU networks. Recall
that for a given time interval τ, we compute normal
and DDoS trafﬁc matrices that give average trafﬁc rates
across that interval. These matrices are used to generate
the trafﬁc ﬂows for that time interval. Both DDoS and
network trafﬁc are simulated as constant bandwidth UDP
streams with ﬁxed packet sizes of 1 kB.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We begin our evaluations in Section VI-A by quan-
tifying the potential extent and severity of the problem
that we are trying to address – the amount of collateral
damage in each network in the absence of any protection
mechanism. We then develop an understanding of the
damage mitigation capabilities and properties of our PSP
1RIO is WRED with two priority classes.
mechanism, ﬁrst at the network level in Section VI-B
and then at the individual OD-pair level in Section VI-
C. Section VI-D explores the effectiveness of the pro-
posed schemes under scaled attacks, and Section VI-E
summarizes all the results.
We shall use the term No-PSP to refer to the baseline
scenario with no surge protection. We use the terms
Mean-PSP and CDF-PSP to refer to the PSP schemes
that use proportional and empirical CDF-based water-
ﬁlling bandwidth allocation algorithms respectively. Re-
call that an OD pair is considered as (i) an attacked OD
pair if there is attack trafﬁc along that pair, (ii) a crossﬁre
OD pair if it shares at least one link with an OD pair
containing attack trafﬁc, and (iii) a non-crossﬁre OD
pair if it is neither an attacked nor a crossﬁre OD pair.
A. Potential for Collateral Damage
We ﬁrst explore the extent to which OD pairs and their
offered trafﬁc demands are placed in potential harm’s
way because they share network path segments with a
given set of attack ﬂows. In Figure 7, we report the
relative proportion of OD pairs in the categories of
attacked, crossﬁre, and non-crossﬁre OD pairs for both
the US and EU backbones.
As described in Section V-B, 40% of the ingress
routers and 25% of the egress routers were involved in
the DDoS attack on the US backbone. In general, for
a network with N ingress/egress routers, there are N 2
possible OD pairs (the ratio of routers to OD pairs is
1-to-N). For the US backbone, with about 700 routers,
there are nearly half a million OD pairs. Although 40%
of the ingress routers and 25% of the egress routers were
involved in the attack, the number of attack destinations
from each ingress router was on average about 24 egress
routers, resulting in just 1.2% of the OD pairs under
direct attack. In general, because the number of OD pairs
grows quadratically with N (i.e. N 2), even in a highly
distributed attack scenario where the attack ﬂows come
from all N routers, the number of OD pairs under direct
attack may still only correspond to a small percentage
of OD pairs. For the EU backbone, there are about 850
routers and about three quarters of million OD pairs.
For the targeted attack scenario described in Section V-
B, 40% of the ingress routers were also involved in the
DDoS attack, but the attacks were concentrated to just
2% of the egress routers. Again, even though 40% of
the ingress routers were involved, only 0.1% of the OD
pairs, among N 2 OD pairs, were under direct attack.
In general, the percentage of OD pairs that are in the
crossﬁre of attack ﬂows depends on where the attacks
occurred and how trafﬁc is routed over a particular
network. For the US backbone, we observe that the
percentage of crossﬁre OD pairs is very large (95.5%),TABLE II
COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN THE ABSENCE OF PSP WITH THE10 th
AND90th PERCENTILE INDICATED IN THE BRACKETS.
Impacted Impacted Mean packet loss rate
OD Pairs(%) Demand(%) of impacted OD pairs(%)
US 41.37 37.79 49.15
[39.64, 42.72] [35.16, 39.37] [47.62, 50.43]
EU 43.18 45.33 68.11
[38.48, 47.81] [38.90, 52.05] [65.51, 70.46]
causing substantial collateral damage even though the
attacks were directed over only 1.2% the OD pairs. This
is somewhat expected given the distributed nature of
the attack where a high percentage of both ingress and
egress routers were involved in the attack. For the EU
backbones, the observed percentage of crossﬁre OD pairs
is also very large (83.5%). This is somewhat surprisingly
because the attacks were targeted to only a small number
of egress routers. This large footprint can be attributed
to the fact that even a relatively small number of attack
ﬂows can go over common links that were shared by a
vast majority of other OD pairs.
We next depict the relative proportions of the overall
normal trafﬁc demand corresponding to each type of OD
pairs. While the classiﬁcation of the OD pairs into the 3
categories is ﬁxed for a given network and attack matrix,
the relative trafﬁc demand for the different classes is
time-varying, depending on the actual normal trafﬁc
demand in a given time interval. Figure 8 presents a
breakdown of the total normal trafﬁc demands for the 3
classes across the 48 time intervals that we explored.
Note that for both the networks, crossﬁre OD pairs
account for a signiﬁcant proportion of the total trafﬁc
demand. Figures 7 and 8 together suggest that an attack
directed even over a relatively small number of ingress-
egress interface combinations, could be routed around
the network in a manner that can impact a signiﬁcant
proportion of OD pairs and overall network trafﬁc.
The results above provide us an indication of the
potential “worst-case” impact footprint that an attack can
unleash, if its strength is sufﬁciently scaled up. This is
because a crossﬁre OD pair will suffer collateral packet
losses only if some link(s) on its path get congested.
While the above results do not provide any measure of
actual damage impact, they do nevertheless point to the
existence of a real potential for widespread collateral
damage, and underline the importance and urgency of
developing techniques to mitigate and minimize the
extent of such damage.
We next consider the actual collateral damage induced
by the speciﬁed attacks in the absence of any protection
scheme. We deﬁne a crossﬁre OD pair to be impacted
in a given time interval, if it suffered some packet loss
in that interval. Table II presents (i) the total number of,
and (ii) trafﬁc demand for the impacted OD pairs as a
percentage of the corresponding values for all crossﬁre
OD pairs, and (iii) the mean packet loss rate across
the impacted OD pairs. To account for time variability,
we present the average value (with the 10th and 90th
percentile indicated in the brackets) for the three metrics
across the 48 attacked time intervals. Overall, the tables
show that not only can the attacks impact a signiﬁcant
proportion of the crossﬁre OD pairs and network trafﬁc,
but that they can cause severe packet drops in many of
them. For example, in the EU network, in 90% of the
time intervals, (i) at least 39.64% of the cross-ﬁre OD
pairs were impacted, and (ii) the average packet loss
rate across the impacted OD pairs was 47.62% or more.
To put these numbers in proper context, note that TCP,
which accounts for the vast majority of trafﬁc today, is
known to have severe performance problems once the
loss rate exceeds a few single-digit percentage points.
B. Network-wide PSP Performance Evaluation
We start the evaluation of PSP by focusing on
network-wide aggregate performance for crossﬁre OD
pairs and note the consistent substantially lower loss
rates under either Mean-PSP or CDF-PSP across the
entire day.
1) Total Packet Loss Rate:
For each attack time interval, we compute the total
packet loss rate which is the total number of packets
lost as a percentage of the total offered load from all
crossﬁre OD pairs. Table III summarizes the mean, 10th
and 90th percentile of the total packet loss rates across
48 attack time intervals. The mean loss rates under No-
PSP in US and EU networks are 17.93% and 30.48%,
respectively. The loss rate is relatively stable across time
as indicated by the tight interval between the 10th and
90th percentile numbers. In contrast, the mean loss rate
is much smaller, less than 3%, for either PSP scheme.
Figure 9 shows the loss rate across time, for the 2 PSP
schemes, expressed as a percentage of the corresponding
loss rates under No-PSP. Note that even though the attack
remains the same over all 48 attack time intervals, the
normal trafﬁc demand matrix is time-varying, and hence
the observed variability in the time series. In particular,
we observe comparatively smaller improvements during
the the network trafﬁc peak times, such as 12PM (GMT)
in the EU backbone and 6PM (GMT) in the US back-
bone. This behavior is because the amount of trafﬁc
that could be admitted as high priority is bounded by
the network’s carrying capacity. During high demand
time intervals, on one hand, links will be more loaded
increasing the likelihood of congestion and overload.
On the other hand, more packets will get classiﬁed
as low priority, increasing the population size that can
be dropped under congestion and overload. Table IV3.3% 1.2%
95.5%
Non-crossfire
Crossfire
Attacked
(a) US.
18.4%
0.1%
81.5%
(b) Europe.
Fig. 7. The percentage of the number of the three OD pair types
classiﬁed under an attack trafﬁc.
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Fig. 8. The proportion of normal trafﬁc demand corre-
sponding to the three types of OD pairs.
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Fig. 9. The crossﬁre OD pair total packet loss rate ratio over No-PSP across 24 hours.(48 attack time intervals, 30 minutes apart).
TABLE III
THE TIME-AVERAGED CROSSFIRE OD-PAIR TOTAL
PACKET LOSS RATE WITH THE 10th AND 90th
PERCENTILE INDICATED IN THE BRACKETS.
No-PSP Mean-PSP CDF-PSP
US 17.93 1.63 1.11
[16.40, 18.79] [1.02, 2.14] [0.47, 1.71]
EU 30.48 2.73 2.32
[27.22, 32.86] [1.21, 4.54] [0.79, 4.22]
TABLE IV
THE TIME-AVERAGEDTOTAL PACKET LOSS REDUCTION RELATIVE TO
NO-PSP OR MEAN-PSP WITH THE 10th AND 90th PERCENTILE
INDICATED IN THE BRACKETS.
Reduction ratio Reduction ratio Reduction ratio
from No-PSP from No-PSP from Mean-PSP
to Mean-PSP to CDF-PSP to CDF-PSP
US 91.00 93.90 34.75
[88.56, 93.89] [90.77, 97.21] [20.06, 53.09]
EU 91.17 92.51 19.90
[85.79, 96.17] [86.46, 97.58] [4.01, 41.58]
summarizes the performance improvements for the PSP
schemes in terms of relative loss rate reduction to No-
PSP or Mean-PSP across the different time intervals. For
each network, on average, either PSP scheme reduces the
loss rate in a time interval by more than 90% from the
corresponding No-PSP value. In addition CDF-PSP has
consistently better performancethan Mean-PSP with loss
rates that are on average 34.75% and 19.90% lower for
the US and EU networks, respectively.
2) Mean OD Packet Loss Rate:
Our second metric is the mean OD packet loss rate
which measures the average packet loss rate across all
crossﬁre OD pairs with non-zero trafﬁc demand. For
each of the 48 attack time intervals, for each crossﬁre
OD pair that had trafﬁc demand in that interval, we
compute its packet loss rate, ie., the number of packets
dropped as a percentage of its total offered load. The
mean OD packet loss rate is obtained by averaging
across these per-OD pair loss rates for that interval.
Table V presents the average, 10th and 90th percentile
values for that metric across the 48 time intervals for the
different PSP scenarios. Figure 10 shows the time series
of the metric for Mean-PSP and CDF-PSP, expressed as
a percentage of the corresponding value for No-PSP. The
table and the ﬁgure clearly show that, across time, No-
PSP had consistently much higher mean OD packet loss
rate than Mean-PSP and CDF-PSP, while CDF-PSP has
the best performance. The percentage improvements are
summarized in Table VI, which show that going from
No-PSP to CDF-PSP results in a reduction in the mean
OD packet loss rate by 87.50% and 89.93% for the US
and EU networks, respectively. Moving from Mean-PSP
to CDF-PSP reduces this loss rate metric by 33.20% and
25.46% respectively in the two networks.
3) Number of impacted crossﬁre OD pairs: We next
determine the number of impacted OD pairs, ie., the
crossﬁre OD pairs that suffer some packet loss at each
time interval. It is desirable to minimize this number,
since many important network applications including
real-time gaming and VOIP are very sensitive to and
experience substantial performance degradations even
under relatively low packet loss rates. For each of the
48 attack time intervals, we determine the number of
impacted crossﬁre OD pairs as a percentage of the0 4 8 12 16 20
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Fig. 10. The mean OD packet loss rate ratio over No-PSP across
24 hours.(48 attack time intervals, 30 minutes apart).
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Fig. 11. The ratio of number of crossﬁre OD-pairs with packet
loss over No-PSP across 24 hours.(48 attack time intervals, 30
minutes apart).
TABLE V
THE TIME-AVERAGED CROSSFIREOD-PAIR MEAN
PACKET LOSS RATE.T HE10th AND90th PERCENTILE
NUMBER ARE INDICATED IN THE BRACKETS.
No-PSP Mean-PSP CDF-PSP
US 20.33 3.75 2.56
[19.25, 21.07] [2.69, 4.31] [1.33, 3.39]
EU 29.34 4.04 3.23
[26.62, 32.16] [2.02, 6.71] [1.09, 5.98]
TABLE VI
THE TIME-AVERAGED CROSSFIREOD-PAIR MEAN PACKET LOSS
RATE REDUCTION RELATIVE TO NO-PSP AND MEAN-PSP WITH THE
10th AND90th PERCENTILE INDICATED IN THE BRACKETS.
Reduction ratio Reduction ratio Reduction ratio
from No-PSP from No-PSP from Mean-PSP
to Mean-PSP to CDF-PSP to CDF-PSP
US 81.65 87.50 33.20
[79.27, 86.19] [83.88, 93.33] [19.65, 52.84]
EU 86.63 89.39 25.46
[79.01, 92.77] [81.15, 95.92] [9.83, 44.94]
TABLE VII
THE TIME-AVERAGED NUMBER OF IMPACTED
OD-PAIRSWITH PACKET LOSS WITH THE10th AND
90th PERCENTILE INDICATED IN THE BRACKETS.
No-PSP Mean-PSP CDF-PSP
US 41.37 12.85 7.16
[39.06, 42.73] [9.58, 14.58] [3.94, 9.24]
EU 43.18 12.81 8.79
[38.43, 47.94] [7.28, 19.70] [3.84, 15.46]
TABLE VIII
THE TIME-AVERAGED REDUCTION OF NUMBER OF IMPACTED
OD-PAIRS WITH PACKET LOSS RELATIVE TO NO-PSP AND
MEAN-PSP WITH THE 10th AND90th PERCENTILE INDICATED IN
THE BRACKETS.
Reduction ratio Reduction ratio Reduction ratio
from No-PSP from No-PSP from Mean-PSP
to CDF-PSP to CDF-PSP to CDF-PSP
US 69.05 82.82 45.47
[65.20, 75.64] [78.11, 90.22] [35.12, 59.30]
EU 71.18 80.42 34.94
[58.62, 81.49] [67.66, 90.36] [21.72, 47.60]
total number of crossﬁre OD pairs with non-zero trafﬁc
demand in that time interval. We summarize the mean
and the 10th and 90th percentiles from the distribution
of the resulting values across the 48 time intervals in
Table VII for No-PSP and the two PSP schemes. The
mean proportion of impacted OD pairs drops from a
high of 41.37% under No-PSP to 12.85% for No-PSP
to 7.16% for CDP-PSP. We present the time series of
the proportion of impacted OD pairs for the two PSP
schemes (normalized by the corresponding value for No-
PSP) across the 48 time intervals in Figure 11, and
summarize the savings from the 2 PSP schemes in Ta-
ble VIII. Across all the time intervals, we note that a high
percentage of crossﬁre OD pairs had packet losses under-
No-PSP, and that both PSP schemes dramatically reduce
this proportion, with CDF-PSP consistently having the
lowest proportion of impacted OD pairs. Considering
the Table VIII , the proportion of impacted OD pairs
in the US network is reduced, on average, by over 69%
going from No-PSP to Mean-PSP. From Mean-PSP to
CDF-PSP, the proportion drops, on average, by a further
substantial 45.47%.
C. OD pair-level Performance
In Section VI-B, we explored the performance of the
PSP techniques from the overall network perspective.
We focus the analysis below on the performance of
individual crossﬁre OD pairs across time.
1) Loss Frequency: For each crossﬁre OD pair, we
deﬁne its loss frequency to be the percentage of of
the 48 attack time intervals in which it incurred some
packet loss. Note that this metric only captures how
often across the different times of day, a crossﬁre OD
pair experiences loss events, and is not meant to capture
the actual magnitude of individual loss events which
we shall study later. Figure 12 plots the cumulative0 20 40 60 80 100
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Fig. 12. CDF of the loss frequency for all crossﬁre OD pairs.
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Fig. 13. CDF of the 90 percentile packet loss rate for all crossﬁre OD
pairs.
distribution function (CDF) of the loss frequencies across
all the crossﬁre OD pairs which had some trafﬁc in any
of the 48 intervals. In the ﬁgure, a given point (x,y)
indicates that y percent of crossﬁre OD-pairs had packet
loss in at most x percent of the attack time intervals.
Therefore, corresponding to the same x value, the larger
the y value for a PSP scheme, the better because that
indicates that the scheme had a higher percentage of
OD pairs with loss frequency less or equal to x. The
ﬁgure shows that across the range of loss frequencies,
CDF-PSP always has the highest percentage of OD
pairs comparing to the other PSP schemes at any given
x value. In particular, both CDF-PSP and Mean-PSP
substantially increase the number of OD pairs without
packet loss at any of 48 attack time intervals, with CDF-
PSP performing the best. The percentage of OD pairs
with 0% loss frequency increase from 55.86% for No-
PSP to 62.83% for Mean-PSP and 72.97% for CDF-PSP
for the US network. The correspondingvalues for the EU
network are 50.44%, 63.22% and 70.91%, respectively.
In addition, for the US network, 98% of the OD pairs
have loss frequencies bounded by 22.92% under Mean-
PSP and 18.75% under CDF-PSP. Considering the 98%
coverage of the OD pairs population under No-PSP,
the bounding loss frequency is a much higher 66.67%.
Thus, using either Mean-PSP or CDF-PSP substantially
reduces the loss frequency for a large proportion of the
crossﬁre OD pairs.
2) Packet Loss Rate per OD pair:
After exploring how often packet losses occur, we
next analyze the magnitude of packet losses for different
crossﬁre OD pairs. An OD-pair can have different loss
rates at different attack time intervals, and here for each
crossﬁre OD pair, we consider the 90th percentile of
these loss rates across time, where we consider only
time intervals where that OD pair had non-zero trafﬁc
demand. Figure 13 shows the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of this 90th percentile packet loss rate
across all crossﬁre OD-pairs, except those that had no
trafﬁc demand during the entire 48 attack time intervals.
In the ﬁgure, a given point (x,y) indicates that for y%
of crossﬁre OD-pairs, in 90% of the time intervals in
which that OD pair had some trafﬁc demand, the packet
loss was at most x%. The most interesting region from
a practical performance perspective lies to the left of the
graph for low values of the loss rate. This is because
many network applications and even reliable transport
protocols like TCP have very poor performance and
are practically unusable beyond a loss rate of a few
percentage points. Focussing on 0−10% loss rate range
which is widely considered to include this ’habitable
zone of loss rates’, the ﬁgure shows that both Mean-PSP
and CDF-PSP both have substantially higher percentage
of OD pairs in this zone, compared to No-PSP, and
that CDF-PSP has signiﬁcantly better performance. For
example, the US network, the percentage of OD pair
with less than 10% loss rate increases from just 59%
for No-PSP to 70.48% for Mean-PSP and 79.62% for
CDF-PSP. The trends are similar for the EU network.
It should be noted that towards the tail of the distribu-
tion, for very large values of the loss rate, the percentage
of OD pairs that have less than a certain loss rate x is
not always greater for CDF-PSP than for Mean-PSP. We
defer the explanation for this to Section VI-C.4 where we
analyze the packet losses of a OD-pair under different
PSP schemes in greater detail.
3) Correlating Loss Rate with OD pair characteris-
tics:
The loss rate experienced by an OD pair for a PSP
scheme is a function of various factors including the
historical trafﬁc demand for that OD pair which inﬂu-
ences the admission decisions to the high priority class.
To understand the relationship, we consider 2 simple fea-
tures of its historical trafﬁc proﬁle. The historical trafﬁc
demand of an OD pair is the trafﬁc demand for that
OD pair averaged across all the historical time intervals.
The historical activity factor is the percentage of time
intervals that the OD pair had some trafﬁc demand out
of all historical time intervals. We explore the relation
between each of these features and the 90th percentile
packet loss rate deﬁned in the previous subsection in the(a) US: No-PSP (b) US: CDF-PSP
Fig. 14. The correlation scatter plot for all crossﬁre OD-pairs between
its 90 percentile OD packet loss rate under No-PSP/CDF-PSP and its
historical trafﬁc demand.
(a) US: No-PSP (b) US: CDF-PSP
Fig. 15. The correlation scatter plot for all crossﬁre OD-pairs between
its 90 percentile OD packet loss rate under No-PSP/CDF-PSP and its
historical activity factor.
scatter plots in Figures 14 2 and 15 3, where each dot
corresponds to a crossﬁre OD pair and the location of
the dot is determined by its 90th percentile packet loss
rate and either its historical demand (Figure 14) or its
historical activity factor (Figure 15).
Comparing the results for No-PSP and CDF-PSP in
the 2 ﬁgures, we note that unlike No-PSP, under CDF-
PSP, the top right region in the plots are empty and that
no OD pair with high historical demand or high historical
activity has a high loss rate. Since the historical demand
and activity factor values for an OD pair does not change
from No-PSP to CDF-PSP, the scatter plots indicate that
for many high demand or high activity factor OD pairs,
the loss rates are dramatically reduced going from No-
PSP to CDF-PSP, shifting their corresponding points to
the left side. Under CDF-PSP, all the points with high
loss rates correspond to OD pairs with low historical
demand or activity factors.
This suggests that CDF-PSP provides better protection
for OD pairs with high demand or high activity. This
is very desirable from a service provider perspective
because OD pairs with high demand or high activity
typically carry trafﬁc from large customers who pay the
most and are the most sensitive to service interruptions.
4) OD pair Loss Improvement:
As mentioned in Section VI-C.2, CDF-PSP does not
always result in a lower packet loss for every OD pair
than Mean-PSP. This can be attributed to the different
amounts of packets being marked in the high priority
class for an OD pair under different policies. It is also
possible that both PSP techniques may exhibit higher
loss rates for some OD pair in some time interval,
compared to No-PSP. This is because under either PSP
scheme, under high load conditions, most of the network
capacity is used to serve high priority packets, and any
residual capacity is used to serve low priority packets.
2The y-axis is cut off at 40,000 kb/s because only a few OD pairs
exceeded that demand and all of them had less than 10% loss rate.
3Due to space constraints, we only show the results for the US
network, while the results are similar in the EU network.
Therefore packets that are marked as low priority will
tend to have higher drop rates than under No-PSP,
where all packets were treated equally. Therefore for
an OD pair, if a large proportion of its offered load
gets marked as low priority, and there is congestion
on the path, in theory it could suffer more losses than
under No-PSP. However, this should not be a common
case, since the PSP bandwidth allocation is designed to
accommodate the normal trafﬁc demand of an OD pair
in the high priority class, based on historical demands.
In the following, we examine how often CDF-PSP has
better performance than either No-PSP or Mean-PSP.
For both No-PSP and Mean-PSP, we determine for
each OD pair the percentage of the 48 attack time
intervals when the packet loss rate was no less than the
loss rate under CDF-PSP. We plot the complementary
cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of this value
across all crossﬁre OD pairs with demand at any of the
48 attack time intervals, for No-PSP and Mean-PSP in
Figure 16. For each curve, a given point (x,y) in the
ﬁgure indicates that for y percent of the crossﬁre OD
pairs, the loss rates are greater than or equal to that under
CDF-PSP in at least x percent of the time intervals. The
graphs indicate that CDF-PSP outperforms both No-PSP
and Mean-PSP for most OD pairs in a large proportion
of the time intervals. Compared to No-PSP, for the EU
network, under CDF-PSP, 90.72% of the OD pairs have
equal or lower loss rates in all 48 time intervals, and 98%
of the OD pairs have lower loss rates in at least 93.75%
of the time intervals. For the same network, compared
to Mean-PSP, CDF-PSP resulted in equal or lower loss
rates at all 48 time intervals for 81.27% of the OD pairs.
D. Performance under scaled attacks
Given the growing penetration of broadband connec-
tions and the ever-increasing availability of large armies
of botnets “for hire”, it is important to understand the
effectiveness of the PSP techniques with respect to in-
creasing attack intensity. To study this, for each network,
we vary the intensity of the attack matrix by scaling the40 60 80 100
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Fig. 16. CCDF of percentage of time that the loss rate for a crossﬁre
OD pair under No-PSP and Mean-PSP exceeds that under CDF-PSP
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Fig. 17. The time-averaged mean crossﬁre OD-pair packet loss rate
as the attack volume scaling factor increases from 0 to 3.
demand of every attack ﬂow by a factor ranging from 0
to 3, in steps of size 0.25. For each value of the scaling
factor, we measure the time-averaged Mean OD packet
loss rate of crossﬁre OD pairs (deﬁned in Section VI-
B.2) across eight 1-min. time intervals, equally spaces
across 24 hours. Figure 17 shows that the loss rate
under No-PSP increases much faster than under Mean-
PSP and CDF-PSP, as the attack intensity increases. This
is because under No-PSP, all the normal trafﬁc packets
have to compete for limited bandwidth resources with
the attack trafﬁc, while with our protection scheme only
normal trafﬁc marked in low priority class is affected
by the increasing attack. Therefore, even in the extreme
case when the attack trafﬁc demand is sufﬁcient to clog
all links, our protection scheme can still guarantee that
the normal trafﬁc marked in the high priority class goes
through the network. Consequently, our PSP schemes
are much less sensitive to the degree of congestion, as
evident by the much slower growth of the drop rate. For
example, in the US network, as the scale factor increases
from 1 to 3, under No-PSP, the mean drop rate jumped
from slightly above 20% to almost 40% . In comparison,
under CDF-PSP, the mean loss rate increases very little
from less than 3% to 4% over the same range of attack
intensities. The trends demonstrate that across the range
of scaling factor values, both the PSP schemes are very
effective in mitigating collateral damage by keeping loss
rates low, with CDF-PSP having an edge over Mean-PSP.
E. Summary of Results
In this section, we summarize the main ﬁndings
from the evaluation of our PSP methods on two large
backbone networks. First, we show that the potential for
collateral damage is signiﬁcant in that even when a small
number of OD pairs are attacked, a majority of the OD
pairs in a network can be substantially impacted. For
both the US and EU backbones, we observed that the
percentage of OD pairs impacted is surprisingly large,
95.5% and 83.5%, even though the attacks were directed
over only 1.2% and 0.1% of the OD pairs, respectively.
Comparing to no protection, Mean-PSP and CDF-PSP
signiﬁcantly reduced the total packet loss up to 97.58%,
the mean OD pair packet loss rates up to 95.92%, and
the number of crossﬁre OD pairs with packet loss by
90.36%. Further, CDF-PSP substantially improved over
Mean-PSP by reducing the loss rate across all evaluation
matrices. Speciﬁcally, CDF-PSP reduced the total packet
loss of Mean-PSP up to 53.09% in the US network
and up to 41.58% in the EU network, and CDF-PSP
reduced the number of OD pairs with packet loss by up
to 59.30% in the US network and up to 47.60% in the
EU network. Finally, we show PSP can maintain low
packet loss rates even when the intensity of attacks is
increased signiﬁcantly.
VII. CONCLUSION
PSP provides network operators with a broad ﬁrst line
of proactive defense against DDoS attacks, signiﬁcantly
reducing the impact of sudden bandwidth-based attacks
on a service provider network. The proactive surge
protection is achieved by providing bandwidth isolation
between trafﬁc ﬂows. This isolation is achieved through
a combination of trafﬁc data collection, bandwidth al-
location of network resources, metering and tagging
of packets at the network perimeter, and preferential
dropping of packets inside the network. Among its
salient features, PSP is readily deployable using existing
router mechanisms, and PSP does not rely on any
unauthenticated packet header information. The latter
feature makes the solution resilient to evading attack
schemes that launch many seemingly legitimate TCP
connections with spoofed IP addresses and port numbers.
This is due to the fact that PSP focuses on protecting
trafﬁc between different ingress-egress interface pairs
in a provider network, and both the ingress and egress
interface of an IP datagram can be directly determined
by the network operator. By taking into consideration
trafﬁc variability observed in trafﬁc measurements, our
proactive protection solution can ensure the maximiza-
tion of the acceptance probability of each ﬂow in a
max-min fair manner, or equivalently the minimization
of the drop probability in a min-max fair manner. Ourextensive evaluation results across two large commercial
backbone networks, using both distributed and targeted
attack scenarios, show that up to 95.5% of the network
could suffer collateral damage without protection, but
our solution was able to signiﬁcantly reduce the amount
of collateral damage by up to 97.58% in terms of the
number of packets dropped and 90.36% in terms of the
number of ﬂows with packet loss. In addition, we show
that PSP can maintain low packet loss rates even when
the intensity of attacks is increased signiﬁcantly.
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